Peer-reviewed publication

Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies

Authors
Kiesow Cortez, Florian and Gutmann, Jerg
Publication
Constitutional Political Economy
Year
2017
Volume / issue
28 (2)
Pages / article
142-166
First published
2017-02-16
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
DOI
10.1007/s10602-017-9238-x
Kiesow Cortez, Florian and Gutmann, Jerg (2017). Domestic institutions and the ratification of international agreements in a panel of democracies, Constitutional Political Economy 28(2):142-166. DOI Full Text
Constitutional design

Research summary

A panel of 99 democracies from 1975 to 2010 is used to test how domestic institutions shape entry into international agreements. Majoritarian electoral systems are associated with fewer agreements, while older democratic institutions and the absence of an independent judiciary are associated with more; party programmaticness and the number of veto players show no robust relationship.